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13 October 1972

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Andrew Marshall, 10 October 1972

The following points were discussed with Andy Marshall at a meeting in his office:

a. Marshall found the two PRG studies very useful and wants to give some thought to possible follow-up. He will make some suggestions, which we can discuss, and we would then be in a position to recommend action to the Working Group.

b. Marshall discussed Jeanne Davis, who heads up the NSC Secretariat, pointing out she had had some qualms about copies of memoranda to Kissinger being laterally disseminated. In the case of the Indo-Pakistan study, Mrs. Davis will send a memorandum to the other addressees asking for their written comments by 15 November. Marshall and I agreed that a useful future procedure with memoranda to Kissinger stemming from Working Group activities would be for me to call Marshall, who after all is closest to Mrs. Davis, so that he can inform her what we plan to do with other dissemination and he can get her advice and concurrence.

c. Marshall discussed the situation on his various studies. The [ ] study is going all right. The Middle East study is "staggering along," as the study chairman is being a bit superficial. Marshall said he would try to apply some pressure to get a deeper analysis. On [ ] [ ] thinks it will be a useful study and can be done (Proctor to the contrary). Fiske is off on two weeks' leave and is going to return to the subject in early November.

On the subject of studies, Marshall felt we ought to be able to stay away from total reliance on experts, who more often than not also turn out to be the authors of the studies under consideration. He asked whether it wouldn't be possible to make greater use of the consumer community, agreeing with me that it was probably out of the question and probably inefficient to attempt to get these things studied by people outside the Government. I promised to talk to

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[REDACTED]

I raised with Marshall the problem of the intelligence community getting no feedback at all from Kissinger's unique experiences in his various foreign negotiations (Soviets, Chinese, North Vietnamese, etc.). I pointed out that if he should leave this world tomorrow or even leave the Government at some point, there would be a large vacuum to represent all that he had experienced. I pointed out this was not a question of finding out what the President was offering Hanoi to get the war finished but rather the totality of his experience with the North Vietnamese hierarchy; the same being true of the Soviets and the Chinese. One of these days, you can bet your hat, he will ask why we don't know more about Brezhnev and we will be in a nice position to come back and say because he never told us! Marshall agreed it was a major problem and promised to address himself to it.

e. Marshall's interest in the "decision-making process" has not evaporated. He still believes a better job can be done on this topic on a number of target countries and pointed out that one didn't always have to think in terms of our denied area friends; [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] When I pointed out that most analysts with whom I have discussed this question usually said that their analysis could not take them any further than the availability of raw data, Marshall said that may be so but that nonetheless analysts were quite willing to make extrapolations on other topics, with which he did not necessarily agree, on an equal paucity of information. I said I felt there was a considerable difference between drawing conclusions on force structures from incomplete data and that of putting together something as psychologically complex as a decision-making process on a punt and a prayer. I guess we agreed to disagree. Nonetheless Andy felt he would like to pursue the matter further and wondered whether sufficient thought had been given to methods of obtaining the kind of information needed to promote this kind of analysis. Marshall would like to talk to somebody of this kind and then he wondered what had happened to a [REDACTED] In what Marshall recalled as being 1965, he had met [REDACTED] in a gathering.

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f. Marshall again brought up the problem of whether the DCI could bring his NSC-type briefings into better coordination with State and DIA. I said I thought it would be better to address the question if this could be made one of the points from Kissinger or the NSCIC as a result of Working Group submissions to them. He agreed.

g. Finally, we discussed briefly what sort of intelligence product Kissinger, and thus the President, sees. Marshall made it clear this was basically the product of the White House Situation Room and this is apparently a real dog's breakfast--any type of current intelligence reporting (including the CIB and the DIA daily, NSA reports, miscellaneous cables from around the world, selections picked out by the NSC staff, sometimes including a letter from the Secretary of State with highlights of overseas reporting, and bits and pieces from the PDB). Although I never was fully able to pin it down, I didn't gather that either Kissinger or the President very often saw the PDB in the form in which it leaves this building. Marshall concluded by saying that Kissinger himself was necessarily crisis oriented.



Bronson Tweedy

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